

Combat arms leaders all agree on the importance of accurate fire. Nevertheless, our Army has not been successful in training the infantrymen in tactical units to high marksmanship standards. If producing infantrymen who are deadly shots is an important goal, then we must analyze our shortcomings systematically; the widespread nature of the problem indicates that small unit leaders are not being provided with the resources necessary for them to succeed.

We recognize the role of master fitness trainers in improving our physical fitness training; we also recognize the need for master gunners in armor units. Marksmanship should receive equal consideration. Each rifle company should have a designated master rifleman and an assistant master rifleman. The company master rifleman's duties

would be to advise his commander on the unit's basic, advanced, and combat marksmanship programs and to serve as the quality control for company "train-the-trainer" instruction. The conventional approach of using a few outside experts to train a large number of noncommissioned officers in a short period of time is not cost effective and simply doesn't work.

The Infantry School should develop a master rifleman program of instruction, taught by the Army Marksmanship Training Unit either at Fort Benning or in the field using mobile training teams. The course should concentrate on both rifles and machineguns.

If the master rifleman concept does make sense, fiscal constraints should not be a limiting factor. Priorities must

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## FIGURE 1

be established. How can we justify sending large numbers of soldiers to schools that do not produce combat skills of immediate relevance to tactical units and at the same time say the Army can't afford a leader-oriented infantry marksmanship program?

The infantry would also do well to learn from the armor community's approach to gunnery. Tank units are generally given set "range packages" and regard gunnery cycles as prime time training. Generally, division and brigade headquarters try their best not to distract the units as they progress through the tank tables. Good results are expected, and they should be. Unfortunately, infantry units do not approach small arms qualification with a similar intensity, and we should not be surprised by the mediocre results that follow.

If infantry battalions are to be guaranteed the time and the ranges they need to conduct high quality marksmanship training semiannually, installations must develop and allocate supporting range schedules. The system in U.S. Army Europe, in which the 7th Army Training Command structures and assigns range times, can serve as a model.




FIGURE 2

A proposed two-week small arms range program for an infantry battalion is shown in Figures 1 and 2. The suggested program supports methodical, progressive marksmanship training taught by a unit's squad leaders instead of by ad hoc committees competing against time.

Installations and divisions should not try to put together one generic range package for all of its battalions, infantry and non-infantry alike, to solve all of their marksmanship problems. Infantry battalions are not expected to train on tank tables, and non-infantry battalions should not be expected to be as proficient in small arms firing as infantry units. Since the basis of a division's rifle firepower lies with its infantry battalions, these battalions should have specifically tailored programs that reflect a requirement to attain the highest standards of marksmanship.

Range time, as well as preparatory marksmanship training (PMT) conducted the week before range qualification, must be priority training for everyone, from the battalion commander down. Since marksmanship is an individual soldier skill, installations and divisions frequently do not categorize small arms qualification as prime time or green cycle training. Since an infantry unit can muster the land, ammunition, and time to qualify only twice a year, though, it must take an approach that strives to have all of its assigned soldiers participate in PMT and subsequent range weeks, even to the extent that its collective training may be marginally affected. Again, if the objective is to develop infantrymen who can fire their weapons accurately, then we must ensure that installation time management systems help us rather than hamper us.

## PRELIMINARY TRAINING

Each range program should be preceded by one week of PMT. Companies, using their master riflemen (or subject matter experts), should conduct two days of training for the leaders at squad level and above. Then the squad leaders should give their assigned soldiers two days of PMT. If training aids are limited, this PMT may have to be coordinated by the battalion headquarters to ensure that the available resources are used equitably and efficiently. A proposed rifle company two-day M16A2 PMT program divided into four blocks of instruction (morning and afternoon) is shown in Figure 3.

During their range times, infantry battalions should move to and live in the field. This is important for several reasons. First, it is the most efficient approach. Qualification ranges are often too far from garrison, and infantry logistics too constrained, to warrant daily transportation shuttles. Second, time will always be a precious commodity. Units that live on ranges consistently put bullets down range at first light and continue to do so until last light. Murphy's Law ensures that any other system will lead to the loss of three or four hours of daylight firing.

Units must take enough of the right kind of training aids to the ranges. A soldier who has difficulty zeroing his rifle, for example — or who performs poorly during feedback,

SUBJECT	TRAINING AIDS		
o Marksmanship, fundamentalis	o Charts: integrated act of firing, sight alignment; breath control o Shadow box o Belgian prism o Dime (for dime and washer drills)		
o Teroing (sight manipulation/ shot group analysis)	o Charts: MIGAZ rear and front sights, mechanical zero, shot group analysis		
o Meaponeer zero and fire/ MACS (multipurpose arcade combat simplator) zero and firing/training file	o Meaponeer o MACS computer o Television tapes 7-1 and 7-2 (teaching basic rifle marksman- ship, Parts I and II)		
o Effects of wind and gravity/ adjusted aiming point	o Charts: FN 23-9, Appendix F. Figures 5, 7, 8, 9, and 12		
MOTES:  1. Each subject is taught by sq allotted for each. The runs training by platoon/company			

## FIGURE 3

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field, or record firing — must be given remedial training on site using such devices as the weaponeer and the shadow box. Too frequently, units continue having a soldier fire until he obtains a zero by chance, or qualifies on paper only. Causes, not symptoms, must be treated.

Most important to the success of a range program, however, is a unit's ability to put its squad leaders in positions where they can coach their own soldiers. The proposed twoweek program requires squad leaders to be present whenever their soldiers qualify with their assigned M16A2s, M9s, M203s, M249s, and M60s. Although consolidated ranges are efficient on paper, if first-line supervisors are not present during weapon qualification, haste and waste is almost always the order of the day.

Infantry battalions must also emphasize combat marksmanship as part of their overall training program. Combat marksmanship training includes fire and movement, control and distribution of unit fire, firing under stress, and firing in various weather and light conditions.

The starting point in developing a combat marksmanship program is the realization that small unit live fire exercises will never be conducted as frequently as the commander desires because of resource constraints. At the same time. when live fires are conducted, more Class V (at least 5.56mm) will often be available than is needed to accomplish the basic training objective — a squad reaction to contact, for example. Generally, units focus on one task or battle drill, complete it, and then fire all their remaining ammunition in a "mad minute" against an invisible counterattack.

Commanders must make the most of the opportunities each live fire exercise presents. A squad reaction to contact drill, for example, may consist of an assault during which collective combat marksmanship skills are evaluated by a scoring system that does the following:

- Determines the amount of time the targets were exposed before being taken under effective fire.
- Grades marksmanship (using balloons, fixed target silhouettes inside bunkers, and the like).
- Rewards a unit by giving it credit for any ammunition it has not expended.

Then, instead of having a unit squander its remaining ammunition in fighting off an obligatory counterattack, the squad may force-march to a new position where it fires 20 rounds per man at the 25-meter Alternate Course C on individual lanes. This will give valuable feedback to the chain of command and, perhaps more important, to the individual soldier on the effect of fatigue on marksmanship. Two major training objectives can therefore be accomplished through one live fire exercise.

(As a side note, the major disadvantage of a squad forcedmarch collective live fire exercise today is that no information is provided on how the individual soldier shoots while under stress, and no meaningful corrective training occurs after the exercises. This does not make sense. We must try to evaluate an individual's combat marksmanship skills just as religiously as we test him during semiannual qualifications.)

Additionally, we must stress to our subordinates that MILES is the best combat marksmanship training device available and that they should use it whenever possible. Even



so, if the chain of command does not emphasize marksmanship skills during MILES force-on-force exercises (by stressing boresighting, for example), much of the training benefit that can accrue from using that device will be lost.

An infantry battalion must be imaginative in its approach to marksmanship training and try to gain every possible advantage from every live fire opportunity. For example, some units always set up 25-meter improvised lanes and rezero their small arms before a live fire exercise. Through rezeroing, all soldiers have an opportunity to adjust for changes to their sight pictures. (This is especially important for the younger soldiers.) Rezeroing also reinforces the importance of well-aimed shots before a unit crosses the line of departure.

A second example of making every round count pertains to live fire exercises during which the soldiers wear protective masks. Units often comply literally with the guidance found in Field Manual 23-9 and conduct 20-round firing exercises in MOPP (mission oriented protective posture) from the prone unsupported and individual fighting positions at 25meter targets. But the soldiers never gain any precise feedback on their accuracy until they have expended all of their ammunition. This kind of firing initially should be at a zero target to provide a soldier with accurate information on how he must adjust his aim to hit the target at center of mass. Only then should he be permitted to fire to achieve the standard of 11 target hits out of 20 exposures.

A third example concerns opportunity firing on live fire exercise ranges. Units should consider conducting MOPP or night firing, or both, whenever a windfall of ammunition appears at the end of an exercise. Opportunity firing strengthens critical marksmanship skills and can also eliminate the need to concentrate on anything except the basics during range time.

Finally, infantry battalions should fire as frequently as

possible. A battalion that is not otherwise conducting range programs or live fire exercises should always schedule at least a 25-meter range and forecast a limited amount of ammunition each month. This range can be used to have newly assigned or reassigned soldiers zero or rezero their weapons, to conduct combat marksmanship training after forced marches, and to carry out both MOPP and limited 25-meter feedback firing exercises. To increase the frequency and quality of our marksmanship training, we should reduce, if necessary, the amount of ammunition fired during collective live fire exercises.

Infantry battalions can improve the quality of their marksmanship programs if they give those programs the proper emphasis. The training strategy outlined here advocates the following:

- Establishing a master rifleman program.
- · Creating small arms range times and designating these as prime time training.
- Increasing our emphasis on combat marksmanship training.
- · Adopting a "make every round count" approach to all live fire opportunities.
  - Firing more often using fewer bullets.

Regardless of the specific marksmanship training strategy an infantry unit adopts, however, it must be based upon this principle: Commanders must not only emphasize marksmanship in words, they must also set up their subordinates for success (down to the squad level) by giving them the necessary training resources and guidance.

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